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1 
 
If we are to believe Cicero’s reports in his Brutus, sentimental 
discourses were a staple of Roman legal and legislative 
proceedings.  For example, he praised Servius Sulpicius Galba as 
an orator “who inflames the court,” thus accomplishing “far more 
than the one who merely instructs it.”  When charged with 
massacring Lusitanians, “with tears in his eyes [Galba] 
commended to [the Roman people’s] protection his own children 
as well as the young son of Gaius Gallus.  The presence of this 
orphan and his childish weeping excited great compassion” (xxii, 
89-90), and of course Galba was acquitted.  Even casual readers of 
the Iliad discover speeches full of invective (Achilles’ rage), 
patriotic encomium (Hector’s battle cry), and sententious 
disquisitions on the nature of life, love, death, and sociality 
(Achilles’ vision of Patroclus).  These can unify a people around 
sentiments of duty, patriotism, fidelity, and amity (books 1, 12, and 
23). 
 
 
2 
 
In spite of such examples of emotional advocacy and bonding, 
pathos and the sentimental appeal have regularly come under 
attack in the West.  Plato’s rants on poetic delirium in the Ion and 
his authorship of Callicles’ cynical discussion of public emotion 
and politics in the Gorgias are undisguised assaults on the force of 
feelings in public places.  Plato was convinced that episteme 
inevitably erodes in the discourses of doxa.  The Church Fathers – 
Tertullian in particular – believed with equal firmness that desire 
releases from the bondage of proper personal control all manner of 
licentious behavior (Sider 1971).  Thence it undermines divine 
authority over human action.  Thus, perhaps oddly, pathos always 
has been recognized as a mode of proof ( pistis) in the rhetorical 
canon; yet it always is to be in some way circumscribed, tempered, 
or even imprisoned. 
 
 
3 
 
To address all emotional appeals in public rhetoric could rapidly 
become an exercise in hyper-abstraction.  Even sentimentality, as 
only one strain of emotional discourse, is too multidimensional for 
a single analysis.  So we focus here on the use of sentimental 
discourse to rouse, intensify, then celebrate political action and 
group membership.  Yet the larger aim remains to see how we 
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ultimately might analyze the places of pathos in rhetoric. 
 
4 
 
In our time, the central medium of sentimental politics is 
television.  When a reader has not – literally – seen some of the 
televisual events noted here, the analysis of sentimentalization 
could lose its evocativeness.  Not to worry, though, for new 
exemplars are no further away than the next televised speech 
about God, motherhood, and country. 
 
 
5 
 
The modern case for sentimentalizing moral action in public 
emerges in the Scottish Enlightenment, and it becomes 
particularly clear in Adam Smith.  So we turn next to his 
breathtakingly compressed talk about sentiment, vision, and 
action, and some positive and negative assessments of sentimental 
words and pictures.  Then we examine three prominent forms of 
sentimental argument in present politics:  patriotic calls to party 
support, personalized appeals to political action, and collective 
celebrations of political membership.  To conclude, we return to 
the larger horizons of political practice, theory, and ethics for 
pathos in our rhetoric. 
 
 
 
 Sentimentalizing Moral Action  
 
6 
 
Greek philosophy and Christian theology mostly condemned 
sentimentality.  From the posters for World War I to the film 
genres throughout the twentieth century, visual rhetoric has 
attracted similar deprecation.  Some blasted fallacies of 
propaganda (Lasswell 1971).  Others knew that Leni Riefenstahl’s 
Triumph of the Will (1935) would make Nazis of us all.  Pundits on 
both sides warned that Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 911 could turn 
the 2004 presidential election irrational and immoral.  There 
always has been a tone of elitism in such talk:  hoi polloi are too 
weak-minded to resist visual rhetoric (even if we pundits can see it 
for what it is).  And then, when pictures are added to sentimental 
prose, as we shall see, negative judgments reach new horizons and 
heights.  
 
 
7 
 
Not until Adam Smith’s treatise on The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759) were the emotional and the sentimental framed 
theoretically as proper and effective modes of rhetoric, capable of 
powerful deployment in the pursuit of moral rectitude and political 
action.1  This is not the place for an enlarged examination of the 
eighteenth-century discussions of relationships between 
sentiments and morality.  Suffice it to say that the idea of 
sympathy became a technical, philosophically sophisticated, 
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notion.  Still there is a claim to be made for Smith’s originary 
uniqueness in basing his theory of sentiments on sympathy. 
 
8 
 
Before Smith, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, 
had explored sympathy as a binding, socially powerful force in 
collectivities.  Human collectivities arise, he believed, from a 
“natural” herding and associative principle – a shared sense of 
preservation.  Polities hold together through shared “succour,” 
which could lead to either common affection (if heroic) or division 
(if factious).2 
 
 
9 
 
A second tack was taken by David Hume.  While his Enquiries 
Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the 
Principles of Morals (1975a) discusses sympathy in social terms 
not unlike Shaftebury’s, Hume’s earlier Treatise of Human Nature 
(1975b) offers a psycho-epistemological approach to the idea.  It 
features the paradox of how it is that we can react to another’s 
fortune (or misfortune) through both sympathy and envy – or 
sympathy and enjoyment (Deleuze 1991).  Hume’s principal tactic 
in handling the paradox was through what Baier (1991, p. 147) 
identifies as “the principle of comparison” – a version of a 
cognitive process whereby “lively ideas” about self are set against 
each other.  In the Treatise, then, Hume probed the mind’s 
involvement with an outside (here social) world. 
 
 
10 
 
The uniqueness – and utility – of Smith’s approach to sympathy is 
that it is neither grossly social nor minutely psycho-
epistemological.  It is based on what Nussbaum (1995, pp. 72ff.) 
identifies as a theory of the “judicious spectator,” an idea 
developed further here.  Such a theory does not account for 
sociality, but neither does it depend on comparisons between the 
spectator’s own situation and that of another.  Smith’s doctrine of 
sympathy involves not coming to know but coming to judge.  
Hence it is not just associative (Shaftebury) or comparative 
(Hume) but evaluative.  It involves a kind of personal 
identification but also an essentially external assessment. 
 
 
11 
 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments opens with Smith’s famous 
statement about human sympathy:  “How selfish soever man may 
be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their 
happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it” (p. 9).  For Smith, sympathy 
operates directly, much like sympathetic or harmonic vibration, 
without the interposition of systematic cognition:  “Whatever is the 
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passion which arises from any object in the person principally 
concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his 
situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator” (p. 10). 
 
12 
 
Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the 
passion, as from that of the situation which excites it.  We 
sometimes feel for another, a passion of which he himself seems to 
be altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his 
case, that passion arises in our breast from the imagination, 
though it does not in his from the reality.  We blush for the 
imprudence and rudeness of another, though he himself appears to 
have no sense of the impropriety of his own behaviour; because we 
cannot help feeling with what confusion we ourselves should be 
covered, had we behaved in so absurd a manner (p. 12). 
 
 
13 
 
Analogous emotions come to our thoughts because people project 
themselves psychologically into the situations where they see 
others.  
 
14 
 
Smith explained that mutual sympathy – the experiencing of joy 
and grief jointly with others – enlivens our emotional experiences.  
It adds collective joy to our pleasant experiences, and it allows the 
sympathy of others to help us alleviate our personal sense of 
tragedy (I.i.chapter 2).  By Part III of his treatise, Smith argued 
further that sympathy grounds judgments of conduct by ourselves 
or others, since these mirror each other in our comparisons 
(especially pp. 109-110).3 
 
 
15 
 
Such mirroring does not turn two persons into one; separate 
identities are maintained.  Thus cognitive processes are central to 
Smith’s understanding of sympathy.  He wrote of the “judicious 
spectator” in the language of cognitive processing:  “the spectator 
must . . . endeavor, as much as he can, to put himself in the 
situation of the other, and to bring home to himself every little 
circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer.  
He must adopt the whole case of his companion with all its 
minutest incidents; and strive to render as perfect as possible, that 
imaginary change of situation upon which his sympathy is 
founded” (p. 21). 
 
 
16 
 
Martha Nussbaum continues Smith’s line of thought as well as his 
words:  “both empathetic participation and external assessment 
are crucial in determining the degree of compassion it is rational to 
have for the person:  ‘The compassion of the spectator must arise 
altogether from the consideration of what he himself would feel if 
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he was reduced to the same unhappy situation, and, what is 
perhaps impossible, was at the same time able to regard it with his 
present reason and judgment’” (1995 pp. 73-74; Smith 1759, p. 
12).  For Smith and Nussbaum, both empathy and rational 
judgment can coexist phenomenologically (see Smith’s examples, 
p. 16). 
 
17 
 
Throughout the treatise, Smith’s imagery for sympathy is visual:  
seeing, mirroring, reflecting, spectating, depicting events in fact or 
imagination.  When talking about regulating our own conduct in 
the presence of others, Smith said, “We suppose ourselves the 
spectators of our own behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what 
effect it would, in this light, produce upon us.  This is the only 
looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of 
other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct.  If in 
this view it pleases us, we are tolerably satisfied” (p. 112).  His is a 
language of spectators, images, looking-glasses, eyes, and views. 
 
 
18 
 
For Smith, such self-examination produces a divided persona.  “In 
all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons.”  He 
argued “that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different 
character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined 
into and judged of” (p. 113).  Smith contrasted these as the 
spectator and the agent.  Such a divided self resurfaces in George 
Herbert Mead’s (1934) distinction between the acting “I” and the 
judging “me.” 
 
 
19 
 
And so in the late eighteenth century, there appeared a theory of 
moral and political action based on an emotion- and vision-
centered theory of sociality.  Smith’s titular term, “moral 
sentiment,” framed an entrance into non-logical – though certainly 
not non-rational – modes of collective decision making.  The next 
century saw continued exploration of sentimentality as a basis of 
ethics and politics in the loosely moralistic popular literature of the 
West (Black 1978).  Verbal depiction of social-political situations 
as well as of morally sensitive behavior within such situations was 
central to the English artis poetica et rhetorica (Osborn 1982).  
The same held for the bombastic, spread-eagle oratory prominent 
in American commemorative politics (Weaver 1953).  But once the 
techniques of verbal depiction at the heart of the sentimental style 
were supplemented by the mechanically reproduced visual images 
and sounds of twentieth-century media, concern for the irresistible 
power of imaged sentimentality became even greater. 
 
 20  That new twentieth-century professional, the publicist, often  
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followed the advice of AT&T Director of Public Relations William 
P. Banning:  if the publicist “will remember that an appeal to the 
heart, to the sentiments, is more resultful than one based on logic, 
he has the beginnings of a good technique” (Ewen 1996, p. 194).  In 
the same 1923 speech, he also recommended that the professional 
should “Think of your whole advertisement as a picture, and I 
believe you will find the problem of securing an attractive result 
will be simplified” (p. 195).  Banning was echoing the assumptions 
of social psychologist Harry Overstreet at the New School for 
Social Research:  “words and pictures are tools.  They are tools for 
communicating ideas, stimulating interests, arousing feelings and 
emotions” (p. 197).  In an explanation that parallels Smith’s theory 
of sympathy, Overstreet held that pictures were all-powerful 
because “The secret of all true persuasion is to induce the person 
to persuade himself.  The chief task of the persuader, therefore, is 
to induce the experience.  The rest will take care of itself” (p. 199; 
see Sproule 1997, especially chapter 1).  Smith treated situational 
cues in a similar way. 
 
21 
 
In this mode, mechanically reproduced images of society took 
center stage in western politics.  The poster propaganda of World 
War I (Hardie 1920) joined the photos that filled the newspapers 
of the time (Gidal 1973).  Film newsreels appeared in 1911, and 
sound newsreels in 1927 (Fielding 1972).  The first campaign film 
was made for Calvin Coolidge in 1924 (Morreale 1993).  Social-
action documentary films became popular for Americans and 
Britons in the 1930s (MacCann 1973).  By 1952, political 
programming and advertising were becoming familiar on 
American television (Becker 1979). 
 
 
 
 Fearing Sentimental Images  
 
22 
 
Sentimentalized visual discourses have invaded social and political 
relationships – particularly the worlds of public relations, product 
and political advertising, political commemorative spectacle, and 
political campaigning.  This has been highly controversial.  When 
Edwin Black ruminated on the rise of the sentimental style in 
nineteenth-century literature and oratory, he was repelled by what 
he saw:  “I believe it useful to view the sentimental style as the 
manifestation of a disposition to subordinate all values to aesthetic 
values in order, essentially, to escape the burden of moral 
responsibility” (1978, p. 83).  The heir to that style in our time, 
Black suggested, is television: 
 
 23  Television news presents a veritable plethora of moral concern,  
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and we viewers are invited to live lives of unremitting social guilt.  
But even when it has horrors to convey, television orders, edits, 
and comments upon its photography with strict attention to the 
dramaturgic expectations of its audience.  Thus, television 
reportage works, as the sentimental style did, to render public 
issues aesthetically palatable (p. 84). 
 
24 
 
Black proceeds to argue that there are affirmative aspects of 
sentimentality, because he believes it always is a precursor to a 
new sensibility – a new “style and form of consciousness” (p. 85).  
The compliment is backhanded, though, still distrustful of feeling-
based action. 
 
 
25 
 
The connection of visualization to political sentimentalization has 
been complicated in our time by many accounts.  Guy Debord 
(1983) viewed the spectacle as the West’s means of constructing 
social relationships.  Martin Jay (1994) tells of Europe’s 
epistemological surrender to the ocular-centric from the pre-
Socratics forward.  Paul Messaris (1994) provides a scientistic 
grounding of collective cognition in visual literacy, while  John 
Hartley (1992) constructs links between visual readership and 
political citizenship.  Barbara Stafford’s manifesto on “the 
knowingness of visual communication” attacks “the conjunction of 
psyche with logos” as challenges to those who have equated verbal 
language and knowing (1996, pp. 5 and 6).  Innumerable 
postmodern accounts of life stress the (visual) surfaces of 
indeterminate feelings and cognitions (Lyotard 1984; Baudrillard 
1983, 1988).  Any such list can only be suggestive of the range of 
discourses that impinge upon the intersecting topics of visual 
discourse, sentimentality, and social-political action. 
 
 
26 
 
To make this more concrete, consider one of the unhappy accounts 
of emotionalism.  In Seducing America:  How Television Charms 
the Modern Voter (1999), Roderick Hart argues that “Television . . 
. has ushered in a Second Renaissance, substituting mass emotion 
for mass subservience to the church in Rome.  Television has also 
ushered in a Second Enlightenment, requesting that the brain, too, 
serve the dictates of the heart” (p. 153).  In particular, says Hart, 
television makes five unfortunate feelings central to American 
voters: 
 
 
 
 
   1.   detachment:  Television so involves us in the intimacies of 
personality politics that we end up hypersensitized to political 
individuals and thus detached from political institutions and 
actions; 
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   2.   ignorance:   Political information generated by 24/7 news 
overwhelms and shuts us down; it leaves us feeling at sea without 
any actual political knowledge with which to make judgments;  
 
 
 
   3.   obsolescence:  The flood of televised political information 
produces a sense of “nowness,” an “endless string of facts and 
anticipations” (p. 157), that can make yesterday’s information old 
and inadequate for handling tomorrow’s problems, which in turn 
get remade by tomorrow’s facts and anticipations; 
 
 
 
 
   4.   inertness:  Because “television makes watching and doing 
the same thing” (p. 158), political lethargy results from consuming 
televisual political discourses;  
 
 
 
   5.   impotence:  “Because of television,” concludes Hart, “we 
now see all and know all.  When people like ourselves appear on 
television, acting as we might act, we seem to do all as well.  
Television takes viewers into the vestibules of power in 
Washington, into a thousand boudoirs.  Why would people who 
see so much need to act at all?  That, I think, is the question of our 
age” (p. 160). 
 
 
 
 
To Hart, these five states of feeling are products of the seeming 
intimacy, the pseudo-sense of personal involvement in politics, 
produced by the most widely used visual technology in the country 
– along with the culture-sensitive news practices developed for its 
public use.  The five converge to severely strain the efforts of good-
government people to rekindle an American spirit of political 
participation through calls to duty, community, and hope (p. 172). 
 
 
27 
 
In many ways, Hart is correct.  The sentimentalization of politics 
can produce a false sense of intimacy.  In the 1992 president 
campaign, Bill Clinton sat on a couch with his wife while they 
talked to us on 60 Minutes about his relationships with other 
women and the details of their marriage.  We were with them, and 
we felt their pain.  To watch the primetime hours of network 
coverage for a national convention, Republican or Democratic, can 
make us feel we were there, personally guided through the events 
by anchors, reporters, and politicians.  Could Hart be correct about 
the sentimentalizing of politics as the engine of political 
disengagement in our time? 
 
 
 
 Defending Sentimental Images  
 28  Sometimes we might be victimized as citizens by experiences of  
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pseudo-intimacy with politicians and pseudo-involvement in 
politics.  Nonetheless we also can find good, civically positive uses 
of sentimentalization in the visual politics of our time.  In 
commenting in his famous “Conciliation with America” on 
politicization in the American colonies, Edmund Burke argued in 
1775 that “close affection” provided the colonists with “ties which, 
though light as air, are as strong as links of iron” (1963, p. 290).  
“Affection” to Burke is made “from kindred blood, from similar 
privileges, and equal protection.”  So long as affection is 
maintained, he argued, “they will cling and grapple to you, and no 
force under heaven will be of power to tear them from their 
allegiance.”  If affection is dissolved, “the cement is gone; the 
cohesion is loosened; and every thing hastens to decay and 
dissolution.”  Burke’s doctrine here is closer to Shafesbury than 
Smith, though Burke undoubtedly knew the works of both, and 
even reviewed Smith’s work in his major publication series, the 
Annual Register.  All three saw that sentimentalization can be 
essential for creating and maintaining political identity and can 
provide motivational grounds for political action. 
 
29 
 
An article is too short for an adequate theoretical account of 
sentimentalization as a basis for political identity and action.  Here 
I review examples of campaign discourse that emphasize 
sentimentality.  I draw them principally from political conventions 
and campaign advertisements, two of the most heavily viewed 
kinds of political television.  I sort the examples into a taxonomy 
that more or less rationalizes the appeals by hypothesizing why 
they do worthy political work.  Next I examine in more detail a 
particularly interesting example of sentimentalized politics.  Then 
I conclude with comments on the practice, theory, and ethics of 
visual culture in politics.  The goal is to suggest how imaged 
sentimentalization can contribute to citizen engagement. 
 
 
30 
 
Yes, sentimentalization can function in highly negative ways for 
televisual discourse in politics.  Notorious examples include the so-
called “Willie Horton” and “revolving door” ads in 1988 (Jamieson 
1992; Miller 1994) and Patrick Buchanan’s savaging of the “two 
Clintons” in his 1992 address to the Republican National 
Convention.  Emotional tirades can be destructive, even in political 
campaigns.  Yet there are constructive, positive employments of 
emotional messages.  They can do important political work that 
more enlightened appeals to empirical generalizations or tabulated 
data cannot.  Let us look at examples of (1) patriotic appeals, (2) 
personalized politics, and (3) party or other collective celebrations. 
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 Patriotic Calls to Party  
 
31 
 
Political parties must recruit members.  Then they must engage 
discourses that reinforce party attractions and call wayward 
members back to active duty.  Reinforcement discourses can weave 
together many techniques, but sentimentalization is often the 
foundation. 
 
 
32 
 
Take Aretha Franklin’s performance of the national anthem for the 
Democratic National Convention in 1992.  She opened up the text 
by turning “The Star Spangled Banner” into soul music.  In the 
blues tradition, her riffs echoed both tribulation and triumph.  A 
Baptist choir accompanied her, adding vocally to her theatrics.  
Cameras cut between the stage scene and (especially the African-
American) audience members, to show their responses ranging 
from tearful head-nodding to joyful applause.  All this interlaced 
the anthem of collective American identity with more personalized 
testaments to individuals’ feelings about that identity and their 
membership in the Democratic Party. 
 
 
33 
 
Calls to return to party membership take other approaches 
brimming with sentiment.  In 1992, the Republicans used Louis 
Armstrong’s “It’s a Wonderful World” with a film of sentimental 
images.  It is heavy on happy children of varied ethnic 
backgrounds; it includes the young and middle-aged along with 
elderly adults living the good life.  It shows diverse families 
hugging, praying and worshipping, playing sports and family 
games, and greeting each other warmly.  The “colors of the 
rainbow” celebrated in Armstrong’s moralistic tune are illustrated 
iconically, serving as metaphors for the presumed inclusivity and 
cohesiveness of the GOP.  (Because the convention had opened 
with hatchet speeches from the two Pats, Robertson and 
Buchanan, this film also opened up the agenda narrowed by these 
speakers for the Christian Coalition’s morality planks and the 
Buchanan Brigade’s jingoism.) 
 
 
34 
 
Four years earlier, the Republicans had aired an ad late in the 
campaign that began and ended with candidate Bush holding a 
granddaughter.  It intercut shots of mass adoration for Bush (or at 
least his candidacy) with the Bush family barbequing together and 
Bush pledges to foster a “kinder, gentler nation” by listening to the 
voices of the “quiet people” who “moved” him.  Such campaign 
discourses use sympathetic appeals in the way that Smith 
suggested:  by allowing viewers to project themselves into 
situations where they can celebrate the joy of others and the 
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comradeship of group identity in reasonable ways.  The pictures of 
Bush and his grandchildren were hardly capable of converting 
Democrats to GOP voting lists; rather, they employed a familial 
structure, metaphor, within which to live as a Republican. 
 
 
 Personalized Politics  
 
35 
 
A sentimental call to return home is not enough, however, to 
produce political action.  In the age of television, the personalized, 
individuated narrative works synecdochally to materialize political 
motivation and action.  Television is the show-and-tell machine.  It 
is the up-close-and-personal vehicle that offers us individuals who 
can embody the issues addressed by political platforms.  By 1996, 
both parties were filling their conventions with parades of persons 
standing for causes. 
 
 
36 
 
That year, the Democratic National Convention rolled out 
Christopher Reeve on “American Hero Night.”  This was his first 
major public appearance following his paralysis.  He spoke of 
family values and the political family that would join him to fight 
not only for research on spinal-chord injuries but also for helping 
all citizens without support.   His appeal for party dedication to all 
in need was empowered emotionally by sights of his sheer, if 
awkward, physical presence:  laid back in a head-locking, body-
cradling power chair.  The whole speech was phrased in short 
phonetic strings because of his mechanically augmented breathing, 
and his soft voice added to the sentimental appeal.  His 
mechanized walk at the 2000 Democratic National Convention, 
along with the same message, was still another synecdoche for the 
same political commitments. 
 
 
37 
 
Perhaps even more dramatic and equally sentimental was AIDS 
activist Mary Fisher’s appearance on the GOP stage that year with 
a twelve-year-old African American girl.  Heideia had been an 
AIDS baby, and she read a poem about her ambition to be 
anything she wanted.  Fisher added that, when AIDS “has its way 
with me,” her children will belong to the community. 
 
 
38 
 
Yet the highlight of appeals to personalized sympathy at the 1996 
conventions was the seven-minute, breath-by-breath description 
from Vice President Al Gore of his sister Nancy’s death from lung 
cancer.  On the big screen, the Democratic Party and nationwide 
television audiences saw Gore narrate a story of regret, sorrow, 
then anger at the tobacco companies.  The party audience was 
stunned into silence as Gore gulped for air, fought off emotional 
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breakups, and allowed Nancy’s death to turn him into an 
instrument of political wrath.  The cutaway shots of delegates 
paralleled the shots of Gore, as television viewers saw concern 
evolve into tears then an outpouring of support for the David ready 
to take on the Goliaths of corporate tobaccodom. 
 
39 
 
Ironically (or strategically?) Gore began the speech by poking fun 
at his own rational stiffness.  He asked the audience if they wanted 
to see him do the Macarena.  As it shouted encouragement, he 
stood unmoving then said, “Do you want to see me do it again?”  
The contrast between this static opening and the animated story of 
Nancy was breathtaking. 
 
 
 
 Collective Celebrations  
 
40 
 
Party membership and group action can and perhaps should 
culminate in celebration of identities well worn and jobs well 
done.  The Republican Party staged the first great balloon drop on 
the final night of its 1932 convention around the theme “Press on, 
Hoover.”  It offered the newsreel audiences flag-waving, streamer-
covered delegates, African American as well as white.  At least 
since then, party celebrations have pitched the joy of belonging to 
a spectatorial public.  The 1984 GOP final night featured clowns, 
Uncle Sam on stilts, jugglers, and all manner of other 
carnivalesque activity.  The 1992 Democratic National Convention 
reunited the renowned rock group, Fleetwood Mac, to play its 
great hit that had become the Clinton theme song:  “Don’t Stop 
Thinking About Tomorrow.” 
 
 
41 
 
Four years later, the Democrats managed to drop what had to have 
been the greatest volume of balloons as well as multi-colored 
mylar pieces ever hoisted to a ceiling.  Through the hall blared 
songs about utopian life and labor union solidarity to underscore 
the scene.  The GOP in 1996 even brought out its “Singing 
Senators.”  Led by Senate majority leader Trent Lott, they sang a 
patriotic medley that Lott assured everyone illustrated party unity.  
They followed this with an ill-advised (off-key) version of “Elmira” 
in honor of “the next First Lady,” Elizabeth Dole.  The revelry filled 
the front rows with a full-fledged sign corps to provide camera 
shots with poster-board themes and heroic names.  Floor 
demonstrations, outrageous costumes, films, light shows, 
orchestras and bands:  celebratory spectacles become, not just 
contexts for political activity, but self-confirming rituals for 
declaring prideful identity and rewarding action. 
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 A Purple Heart to Share  
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A good case for close examination comes from the 1992 
presidential campaign of Ross Perot.   Its late ads were simple:  a 
colored background with some sort of figure on it, soft music, a 
warm-voiced narrator, and his words scrolling up the screen.  The 
most sentimental spot shows a Purple Heart medal, awarded for 
wounds in battle.  The background is military camouflage for slow 
panning of the stern visage of George Washington within the gold 
outline of the heart.  As a lone trumpet plays a mournful tune, a 
poem-like letter scrolls up the screen.  It is read with raw emotion, 
presumably by its writer: 
 
 
 
           Dear Ross,  
 
 
 
I was awarded the Purple Heart 
for wounds received 
during a Vietnam ambush. 
Over the years, its value to me 
has grown significantly. 
And, like my family, 
it is priceless. 
 
 
 
 
I would be honored if you would 
accept the loan of my Purple Heart 
to keep with you 
throughout the campaign. 
 
 
 
 
I believe that it can serve 
as a compelling reminder 
that the hard battle ahead can, 
and must, be won. 
 
 
 
 
Let it also remind you 
of the army of ordinary citizens 
that has mustered to your call 
and looks to you 
to stop the hemorrhaging 
of the American spirit. 
 
 
 
 
And to restore honesty, 
integrity and responsibility 
to our government. 
 
 
 
 
Like you, I firmly believe 
that if we stand united we will win.  
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                                        Good luck, Ross, 
                                        Dennis Skrivin 
                                        Wilmington, Delaware 
 
 
 
 
The first stanza explains the ad’s premise, while introducing the 
idea of ‘priceless value.’  In the second, the soldier who has 
sacrificed his body for his country announces his willingness to 
part with the marker of his sacrifice, the medal.  The third stanza 
unites battlefield campaigns with political contests by fusing them 
metaphorically in memory.  The fourth stanza identifies military 
mobilization with political mobilization, using blood imagery to 
communicate its seriousness.  The fifth stanza captures the key 
value links between military and political campaigns: “honesty, 
integrity and responsibility.”  Its reference to restoration is typical 
of third-party campaigns, which often look to a golden past that 
must be reassembled in the present.  The final stanza contains a 
turn – “we stand united” – on the Perot party name. 
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The ad is a collective call to patriotic citizenship and even self-
sacrifice.  It taps multiple sentimentalities.  It calls on sympathy 
for a young man wounded in the war nobody celebrated.  It 
displays a solemn presentation of the marker for that heroism to a 
new leader for a new era.  It casts current politics as warfare, 
where survival depends on commitments that, by implication, 
opponents Bush and Clinton do not exhibit.  It alludes to standing 
together late in the campaign as the way to gain what must look 
like an impossible victory in November.  Behind it all looms the 
orant George Washington:  a figure from the depths of American 
doubt, at Valley Forge (1777), during the Revolutionary War.  
Echoing music after the climactic battle in such films as Red Badge 
of Courage (1951) and Glory (1989), the lone trumpet bespeaks 
respect and resolve, a willingness to give the fullest measure. 
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This video borders on the maudlin, even the histrionic.  A faceless 
soldier gives a personal medal to a candidate who never 
shouldered a gun.  The solemn military icon goes to a rich man 
trying to wise-crack his way to the presidency.  Yet all that is 
beside the point.  The ad seeks to commit citizens to Perot – not 
for his proposals, not for his oddly populist appeals, not even for 
the shortcomings of his opponents – but for sentiment:  the appeal 
is to sympathy even as Adam Smith understood it, as grounds for 
moral (here political) action. 
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The ad’s focus of attention is Dennis Shrivin.  He is present only in 
eloquent words, a sincere and tremulous voice, a firm signature.   
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He asks citizens to attend to his sacrifices and commitments, to 
sympathize with him.  He challenges them, like Smith’s judicious 
spectators, to alter their political identities and actions, aligning 
with his devotion to Perot.  They are to join “the army of ordinary 
citizens,” personified in Skrivin.  Amalgamated in identity and 
action, they even can celebrate, “if we stand united,” a victory in 
November.  All three political functions of sentimental appeal – 
the patriotic call, the personalized politics, the celebration of the 
collective – occur in this disarmingly simple sixty-second message. 
 
 
 Practice, Theory, and Ethics  
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Of course, this small video archive has been carefully selected to 
show some potentially productive arguments from sentiment.  
Where might these leave us?  The question needs answers in 
practice, theory, and morality. 
 
 
 
 Practicality  
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Visual politics running on sentimentalized discourses can perform 
important, positive functions.  Patriotism, personalization, and 
celebration of the collectivity are reasonable – indeed quasi-
rational – bases for political identity and behavior.  The patriotic 
appeal is the demand of the patria that citizens fulfill their duties 
to the whole.  It is a traditional form of interpellation.  Patriotic 
appeal is almost visceral.  It attaches to scenes of celebration and 
adoration from youth.  It grounds itself in feelings of joy and 
worry, love and devotion.  Amor patriae, love of country, is an 
ambiguous phrase, with patria coming from pater, Latin for 
father.4  Both foundational institutions for western lives – family 
and country – are captured in patriotic appeal. 
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As a focus on the individual within the whole, personalization, too, 
is an ancient appeal.  Ethos was the concept used to describe the 
moral condition of the Athenian collectivity and the individual 
living in it; an ideal ethos is one where individuals personify socio-
ethical standards.  Technically, therefore, personalization provides 
the essential link between individual and public identity or action.  
It connects individuals to collectivities, and vice versa; it ties our 
own activities to those deemed sociable by our communities.  
Virtues and vices appear in the moral frames provided by the 
images and words of such testifiers as Heideia and Christopher 
Reeve, the tragic stories of Mary Fisher and Al Gore’s sister, or the 
romantic evocations of America in convention films.  This is not 
the aestheticization that escapes moral burdens, as Black argued; it 
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is the personification that rivets individuals to societies and 
personal actions to collective needs.  It works with visualized 
synecdoches to access the moral bases of larger policy arguments. 
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Then celebration completes or affirms political identity and 
action.  Celebration can be the “Amen!” of the congregation 
endorsing calls to duty.  It can be the applause of the society for 
action in response to the calls.  Collective, mutually reinforcing 
actions of the kind seen in the somewhat-embarrassing-but-
enjoyable actions of the Singing Senators or in the group hugs, 
raised arms, and responsive waves of the 1996 Democratic 
National Convention draw a circle around the celebrants, framing 
their celebration on the TV screen.  These words, gestures, and 
rhythms define the in-group.  They affirm it by the collective 
rituals of self-congratulation, group recital, and triumphal music.  
Communal celebration provides legitimation, blessing individual 
performances and the institutional values that make the blessings 
appropriate. 
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There are practical arguments for sentimental images and words.  
Patriotic hailing, personalized story-telling, and collective 
celebration can direct reasonable action and legitimate political 
identity.  These considerations, of course, must resurface when we 
discuss the ethical implications of sentimental appeals. 
 
 
 
 Theory  
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But first the theory of sentimentalization deserves attention.  Two 
strains of theoretical inquiry are especially promising.  For one 
thing, we should consider how these discourses work persuasively.  
Television demands that audiences work across three codes – the 
literate, the acoustic, and the visual – to construct messages made 
out of different sign systems (Gronbeck 1995, 1993).  Most often, 
these discourses work evocatively.  Especially in the acts of 
persuasion identified here, political television elicits from viewers 
the ideational and emotional associations that they make as 
citizens when presented with specific signs in writing, sound, and 
imagery.  This taps a kind of intertextuality where television draws 
power from previously experienced works, which it evokes 
semiotically (Fiske 1989). 
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The GOP film accompanied by “It’s a Wonderful World” depends 
on evoking from its audiences the warmth of familial memories, 
the social support from shaking a neighbor’s hand, the nostalgia of 
seeing an Amish buggy on a dirt road, the smell of a newborn baby, 
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and dozens of other feelings triggered by the visual array of signs 
comprising that film.  The Purple Heart ad is not particularly 
powerful if its viewer does not know that sort of medal, has never 
seen a war movie where those who have died for country are 
recognized by a solitary bugle, or is not aware of American 
discourses about Vietnam.5 
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Persuasion by pathos can put the burden or even the authority for 
changing minds and acts on the listeners or viewers rather than 
the originator of the message.  This is the genius of evocative 
approaches to political (or any other kind of) persuasion.  Only if 
viewers feel in themselves resonant responses to Gore’s 
performance of his sister’s cancer – only if they experience along 
with him his portrayal of sorrow, pity, and holy anger –  does his 
speech justify a jihad against Big Tobacco or respect for Gore as a 
leader. 
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This is the essence of Smith on the judicious spectator.  It 
constructs sentimentality as a proper and useful ground of political 
identity and moral action; moreover the identity and action 
motivate themselves through sympathy.  Message producers 
present an array of particular signs that can spur specific echoes or 
memories – responsive chords, Tony Schwartz (1973) called them 
– in witnesses who then act on them.  The responsibility for 
identities assumed and actions initiated is the judicious 
spectator’s.  Political agency is in the eyes of the beholder, as 
Overstreet argued eighty years ago. 
 
 
55 
 
A second set of theoretical interests involve collateral questions.  
This is not the place for a broad exploration of issues linked to the 
politics of sentimental images.  We do well, though, to notice that 
related concerns include rhetoric’s relationships to hermeneutics, 
deconstruction, and postmodern thought. 
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Derridean (e.g.,1993) issues of destabilized meaning arise from 
this essay’s examples.  What connections of past and present 
operate when we hear Aretha Franklin’s rendition of the “Star 
Spangled Banner” at one convention and the Singer Senators’ 
“Grand Old Flag” at the other?  Likewise the examples are rife with 
hermeneutic circles, deconstructive discourses, and video collages 
that call up Lyotard’s (1984) discussion of the postmodern 
condition.  When Franklin remakes the national anthem to fit an 
African-American soul-singer with a back-up Baptist choir,  we are 
experiencing the destruction and reframing of a master narrative. 
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Recontextualized discourses such as Armstrong’s “It’s a Wonderful 
World” and the Singing Senators’ version of “Elmira” create 
subtexts that insist on analysis.  In radically personalizing his 
sister’s death, Gore savages the tobacco industry and slights the 
medical establishment.  He implies an irrelevance of modern 
institutions to postmodern experiences.  The structuring absences 
in Perot’s “Purple Heart” ad cry out to be made present, in action 
as well as commentary.  The subversion of linguistic rationality 
that is so visible in the Armstrong film and the Bush ads bring 
Baudrillard (1983, 1988) to mind.  The same goes for the strongly 
self-reporting language of Gore.  There is much to learn in the 
structuring of desire when Mary Fisher uses an African-American 
girl and Dennis Skrivin awards Perot a medal for sacrifice. 
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My own work emphasizes rhetoric.  For too long, rhetoric has been 
the hostage of logos.  Rhetoricians generally have bought into the 
hyper-neo-Aristotelian belief that rhetoric ought to produce a 
largely ratiocinative discursive practice, a counterpart 
(antistrophê) for dialectic, not poetic (Gronbeck, 1999).  Lost for 
much of the Western history of rhetorical thought has been a 
serious investigation of relationships among rhetorical discourse 
and desire, feeling states, and moral sentiments within particular 
configurations of time and space.  In segmenting the grounds for 
conviction ( pistis) into three separate mechanisms – logos, ethos, 
and pathos – we have been facile.  We have allowed each to 
become a separate route to public identity and action.  With the 
separation, of course, has come an emphasis on what could then be 
construed as the reasonable ( logos) or even the moral ( ethos) at 
the cost of ignoring or denigrating the emotional ( pathos). 
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A consequence of these great sullies and silences across the 
centuries has been our inability to explain the emotional bases of 
public action outside of wholly rational or quasi-logical and of 
alluring characterological frameworks.  Even in our time, the 
emotional has been regarded as grounded in mob psychology, 
groupthink, or other anti-rational realities and infantile desires to 
follow power.  But emotion might not even be non-rational, let 
alone anti-rational and infantile; feelings are not somehow 
automatically blind or thoughtless.  Rationalists invoke extreme 
examples when they associate emotionalism with Hitler, McVeigh 
and Nichols, the Branch Davidians, or Al Qaeda.  The penchant to 
lump all emotional discourses into barrels of bombast and 
butchery just makes our troubles worse.  To try to excise the 
emotional in the name of political sanity and moral sanitation is to 
attempt the impossible while turning away from the humanizing 
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capacities of sentiment, sympathy, empathy, or sheer feeling. 
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Rhetoric has room for hermeneutics, deconstruction, and other 
postmodern discourses.  Even when hermeneuts tear meaning-
making away from the present, deconstructionists subvert 
manifest meanings, or postmodernists play across surfaces, they 
need not be anti- or counter-rhetorical.  Rather we can move with 
Gaonkar to treat rhetoric as “the foundational discipline . . . for the 
human sciences” (1999, p. 209).  Rhetoric is a general theory of 
discourse but one closely attuned to its situations and users.  Its 
accounts of situated symbol use suit many purposes of 
hermeneutics, deconstruction, and postmodernism.  The stress on 
situations, on the historical specificity of rhetorical acts, makes 
rhetoric a general  theory of discourse – while most forms of post-
talk are not.  Cultural theorists, especially when inspired by 
European traditions, too often settle for ascribing power in general 
to discourses in general.  Rhetorical analysts locate specific powers 
where they operate in concrete settings of everyday life.  Attention 
to situations lets us understand and assess discrete rhetorical 
fields or styles in particular discursive circumstances. 
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The need is not for translations of Baudrillard or Bourdieu into 
some lexicon of enthymemes, dispositional patterns, and schemes.  
We especially need not turn visual discourses into verbal 
equivalents, as though a traditional vocabulary of rhetoric can be 
used to sort visual techniques into the officia rhetoricae.  This 
insults – and destroys – the distinctive richness of visual 
communication in our time.  Because our post-isms are discursive 
practices, with theories of symbol use constructed for purposes at 
once intellectual, social, and political, we can learn from them as 
rhetorical forays into our world (Gronbeck 2005).  This seems to 
me the shared teaching of such critical rhetoricians as McKerrow 
(1989) and such postmodernists as McGee (1990). 
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General talk about the visual world as mere images or surfaces 
tells us little about how specific images work in particular 
contexts.  To dismiss the close of Clinton’s 1996 convention as a 
“deification of technology” (Postman 1992, p. 71) is to say little 
about its effects on viewers.  To argue that “spectacular discourse 
leaves no room for any reply” (Debord 1990, p. 29) is to ignore the 
doxa-like relations between image makers and spectators that 
comprise specific “specular regimes” (Metz 1982, Part III) or the 
democratic ideal of “collective looking” that John Hartley (1992, p. 
36) observes in our time.6 
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Many rhetorical dynamics of sentimental images in American 
politics prove respectable.  Attending to these as well as the 
dubious or outright destructive uses of visual sentiment is one 
good way to enrich rhetoric as a situated theory of situated 
discourse.  When advocates of hermeneutics, deconstruction, or 
other postmodern discourses scorn all television for the sheer use 
of emotive images, these commentators repeat in practice the 
rationalism and logocentrism that they scorn in theory.  When 
rhetoricians appreciate postmodern attacks on general theories as 
important problems and tools for situated rhetoric, the prospects 
for learning about our visual politics of sentiment can expand. 
 
 
 
 Ethicality  
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We come in the end to the matter that started Adam Smith down 
the path of morals and sentimentality:  sentimental discourses can 
induce moral outcomes.  Sentimental images, including television 
images, are no exception; and their political uses are easy to spot:  
good as well as bad.  Many agree with Hart, of course, that imaged 
emotionality charms citizens and seduces America, as his title puts 
it.  Hart on the televised politician luring citizens to political 
positions is much like Plato on Ion as epitome of the rhapsode’s 
art:  “for I look down upon them from the stage, and behold the 
various emotions of pity, wonder, sternness, stamped upon their 
countenances when I am speaking:  and I am obliged to attend to 
them; for unless I make them cry, I myself shall not laugh; and if I 
make them laugh, I shall do anything but laugh myself when the 
hour of payment arrives” (1936, p. 289). 
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To Plato, Ion as the seductive rhapsode was but a link – a magnet, 
Plato called him – in a chain that ran from the gods to Homer to 
the rhapsode to the listener. The chain was constructed “by divine 
inspiration and by possession” (p. 290).  It deserved worry because 
“he who has no knowledge of a particular art will have no right 
judgment of the sayings and doings of that art” (p. 292).  Neither 
the rhapsode nor the listener knows the truth about what the poet 
writes.  In parallel fashion, neither the charming politician nor the 
seduced citizen knows the truth about what the politician makes:  
ads, buttons, videos, speeches, pamphlets, billboards, radio 
addresses, and all of the other political communications that 
bombard us, especially during campaigns. 
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Can these arts be ethical?  Were Plato in his epistemic fit and 
Tertullian in his religious disdain correct?  Of course, if the ancient 
Greek and the early Christian are right to take emotions as tools of  
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anti-rationality, we must be ever on guard against our sentiments.  
We may suppose that action without thought for rationales or 
consequents can lead to equivalents of the Holocaust in Nazi 
Germany, the bombing in Oklahoma City, attacks on abortion 
clinics, outrages of ethnic cleansing, or terrorist assaults on the 
architecture of finance and war as on 9/11/01.  But we may not 
suppose that actual perpetrators have lacked all logic or foresight, 
as though rationality could guarantee morality or preclude 
atrocity.  Nor may we assume that action mindful of sentiment is 
bound to be perverse.  We are not smart even to stipulate that it 
tends to be bad. 
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In assessing the sentimentalization of the political, we do well to 
avoid argumentum in extremis.  The lethargic can be stirred from 
political inactivity to political activity by sentimental appeal.  This 
can be good, bad, or indifferent, depending on particulars of the 
situation that need further investigation.  The sort of situational 
projection that Smith found in sympathy can provide good 
foundations for political identity, or bad, but it is hard to see how 
many needed parts of politics could arise sans sentiment.  
Detachment, ignorance, obsolescence, inertness, and impotence 
are not the only or the inevitable results of imaged feelings; 
political engagement can be as much a positive result of 
sentimental discourses as political apathy can be a negative effect 
of them. 
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The argument here depends on understanding ethics in a pre-
modern sense, as Aristotle understood ethos.  Sentimental images 
on television or computer screens can link individuals 
sympathetically with virtual publics of other people.  In the 
classical sense, this gives sentimental images ethical power.  The 
sentimental can join the reasonable and the characterological in 
our experiences of television.  To appreciate this is to restore 
pathos to its rightful place, with logos and ethos, as part of the 
trilogy of proofs that foster new identities and enable judicious 
public action.  So long as we remember that the image’s “aesthetic 
lightness does not absolve us from mortal gravity,” but instead 
brings with it always an “ethical burden” (Peters 1997, p. 26), that 
judiciousness is an integral aspect of our spectatorship.  We can 
profit more politically from vision-sensitive knowing and feeling-
driven action than we must lose to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
© Bruce E. Gronbeck, 2005.  
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 Notes  
 
 
 
1     Adam Smith was appointed to the Chair of Logic at the 
University of Glasgow in 1751, moving to the Chair of Moral 
Philosophy the next year.  There he lectured on natural theology 
and ethics as topics to precede the lectures on law and 
government.  Essentially he was adapting perspectives and 
examples from his earlier lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres, 
which he had delivered in Edinburgh, 1748-50.  It presumably was 
his peculiar but most interesting combination of political and 
literary principles that made his conceptions of political and 
economic theory, under the heading jurisprudence and civic law, 
so attractive.  See the introduction to Raphael and MacFie’s edition 
of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1976).  References here to 
that work are by section or page within the text. 
 
 
 
 
2     See Shaftesbury’s treatise on Sensus Communis reprinted in 
1999,  pp. 29-69, original publication in 1709,  reprinted in his 
assembled essays as a part of Characteristics of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times, 1711. 
 
 
 
 
3     Smith’s discussion of the mirror or looking-glass produces an 
understanding of self quite similar to Charles Horton Cooley’s 
(1956) theory of the mirrored self (see Denzin 1992, p. 4).  If Smith 
has any currency in American social thought, it may well be 
because he can be considered one of the precursors to symbolic 
interactionism. 
 
 
 
 
4     Technically the word comes from the Greek patriôtikós – a 
citizen whose political agenda were driven by a professed love of 
country.  “Patriot” in that sense became popular in the eighteenth 
century, and even fell into disfavor among English- and French-
speaking peoples because of its association with disruptive 
political connections (the “Young Patriots” of Great Britain) and 
revolution in France.  It was not unlike our use of “super-patriot” 
as a designation today. 
 
 
 
 
5     When I show these video clips in foreign countries, I often get 
very different reactions.  When I show Reagan’s 1984 convention 
film,  for example, its patriotic  tributes simply do not move the 
viewers.  They have no particular civic memories of the invasion of 
Normandy, the demilitarized zone between the Koreas, the 
 
Bruce E. Gronbeck 53 Poroi, 4, 1, March, 2005 
camouflage uniforms of the Grenada soldiers, or Lee Greenwood’s 
intoning of “God bless the U.S.A.” over a montage of stereotyped 
American scenes.  Evocation does not work without memories or 
echoes. 
 
 
 
6     I am liberating the idea of specular regime from Metz’s 
psychoanalytic study of cinema, and more particularly from his 
understanding of the cinematic experience as a waking-dreaming 
state that allows for special kinds of interplays between reality and 
visual discourse.  The idea of regime is useful in a social sense, so 
that specular regimes reference learned modes of displaying and 
interpreting signs. 
 
                        
 
